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Kathleen Stock 
 
This week, Maya Forstater’s appeal against a 2019 employment tribunal verdict has come to 
court. Tax expert Forstater originally brought the US-based Center for Global Development 
to a tribunal after she had expressed certain beliefs on Twitter and been denied work by the 
Center on that basis. The Center had found those beliefs “offensive and exclusionary” and 
failed to renew her visiting fellowship1. At the 2019 tribunal, Forstater’s lawyers argued that 
this failure constituted discrimination on the grounds of philosophical belief, a thing 
prohibited under section 10 of the Equality Act.  But Judge James Tayler demurred, ruling 
that Forstater’s beliefs failed to meet necessary tests for a “philosophical belief” technically 
defined in legal precedent2. Namely: they failed to be “worthy of respect in a democratic 
society” or compatible “with human dignity and fundamental rights of others”. The tribunal 
found that therefore her former employer had done nothing illegal. 
 
The appeal this week, whose verdict will follow in months to come, gave us a chance to 
revisit the particular beliefs at issue, apparently so shocking to Judge Tayler. Forstater 
believes that humans constitute a sexually dimorphic species, typically producing two 
differently sized and shaped beings, whose differently shaped gametes can then combine in 
the process of sexual reproduction. She believes that biological sex for humans is neither a 
feeling nor an identity, but rather a lifelong material state that can’t be changed through 
surgery, drugs, nor anything else.  She believes that the capacity to refer, in language, to 
human biology and its various social impacts is especially important for one sex in particular: 
the female one, given the presence of sexism in society and divergent outcomes for the 
sexes in areas like medicine, sport, employment, and sexual assault statistics. Because of 
these beliefs, she also believes that she and others should be able to refer accurately to the 
sex of trans people in some relevant circumstances, rather than be automatically forced to 
participate in a fiction according to which trans people have changed their sex to their 
preferred alternative. She professes herself politely willing to use preferred pronouns 
corresponding to inner feelings of gender identity, but also wishes to describe trans women 
as biologically male in general terms - a description she believes is accurate - for the 
purposes of certain discussions of women’s rights in practice. This seems to her reasonable 
in a context where public policies about public spaces, resources, and sporting activities are 
increasingly organised around gender identity rather than sex, with arguably serious 
consequences for women and girls.  
 
I’m an academic philosopher, employed at a British university. I share these beliefs of 
Forstater’s. Indeed, I’m about to publish a book defending them. So when the tribunal 
judgement came out, it was more than a little worrying – if not also slightly comic - to 
discover that a judge thinks these beliefs of mine don’t count as “philosophical” enough to 
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gain basic legal protection.  The judge was willing to concede that Forstater’s beliefs – and 
so presumably, mine - attained the required standard of “cogency, seriousness, coherence 
and importance”, though he also suggested the beliefs were false, including the belief that 
there are only two sexes and that sex is immutable. This, he suggested, had been proven by 
modern science to be out-of-date. I think he’s wrong about that and I explain why in my 
book. But either way, his opinion that Forstater is factually wrong is irrelevant as far as the 
judgement goes. It’s not a requirement for protection under law that a belief seem true to a 
judge, nor even that there should be good evidence for it according to experts. Belief 
systems positively protected under Section 10 at previous employment tribunals have 
included Stoicism, Scottish nationalism, spiritualism, and the belief that homosexuality is a 
sin. 
 
The main basis for the original judgement seems to have been the assumption that stating 
beliefs about the sex of trans people – even in a generalised, third-personal form – causes 
them “enormous pain”, possibly even meeting the Equality Act’s definition of harassment in 
some contexts according to the judge. Forstater’s appeal lawyers have argued that causing 
even grave offence doesn’t thereby meet the standard of harassment, and that the context 
of Forstater’s statements shows they were not harassing. In their skeleton argument, her 
team point out that in a pluralist society with many competing perspectives jostling for 
space, the expression of views which cause offense to others is an inevitability3. Hence 
offense on its own cannot reasonably be the grounds of illegality. They also argue, along 
lines originally suggested by John Stuart Mill, that “the taking of offence by one side … may 
indeed underline” the value of speech by the other side, since, where a challenge to a 
valued set of beliefs is particularly cogent and rationally compelling, there’s a human 
tendency to compensate by moving towards defensive outrage in response. Citing multiple 
legal precedents, Forstater’s lawyers stress that it’s not a court’s role to intervene on one 
side or other of any such contentious argument, except in extreme and exceptional cases 
where the aim is the grave destruction of the rights of others – something that is not the 
case for their client. 
 
By now, you might be wondering: how has the expression of relatively mundane beliefs 
about biological classification - beliefs that even five years ago were uncontroversial and 
held by nearly everyone, and that still are held by millions of people worldwide – come to 
count for some, including for the tribunal judge, as approximating harassment? There are 
two plausible explanation: a narrow and a wider one. The narrow explanation is: highly 
efficient activist campaigning. Since 2015, the LGBT charity Stonewall has been advising 
organisations that an inner feeling of gender identity determines how you should be 
referred to in all contexts, rather than actual facts about your sex, or even about your 
possession of a Gender Recognition Certificate if you are trans. Organisations pay to join 
Stonewall’s Diversity Champion programme, whereupon they are instructed to replace 
references to biological or legal sex in policies and resources by inserting reference to 
gender identity or “self-ID” instead. These instructions have been heeded by many national 
organisations, despite neither the Gender Recognition Act 2004 nor the Equality Act 2010 
concerning themselves with gender identity as a concept. Rather, these laws talk of “gender 
reassignment”, legally identifying and protecting a process rather than a feeling. Even so, 
                                                     
3 Appellant’s skeleton argument, Forstater v CGD and others. 
“misgendering” – that is, failing to “respect” a person’s inner feelings of gender identity in 
verbal descriptions of them – has come to be understood by many employers as 
automatically bullying and transphobic if done deliberately, and embarrassing and hurtful 
even if done inadvertently; something for which you should immediately apologise if you do 
it4.  
 
The influence of Stonewall in this respect extends to the justice system. Their Diversity 
Champion programme currently includes the Crown Prosecution Service, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, and several police forces as members5. 
The Equal Treatment Bench Book, produced by the Judicial College in order to guide judges 
in decision-making, also explicitly contains Stonewall recommendations scattered 
throughout. For instance, it advises: “Everyone is entitled to respect for their gender 
identity regardless of their legal gender status. It is important to respect a person’s gender 
identity by using appropriate terms of address, names and pronouns”. It goes on: “It should 
be possible to recognise a person's gender identity and their present name for nearly all 
court and tribunal purposes, regardless of whether they have obtained legal recognition of 
their gender by way of a Gender Recognition Certificate”6. This week, Forstater’s appeal 
team argued that the tribunal appears to have improperly relied on the Bench Book “to 
inform its assessment of the substantive issues”7. (This reliance was underlined by the 
respondent’s legal team in oral argument: at one point their QC relied upon an example of 
misgendering in the book, alleged to constitute trans harassment, asking “How can the 
Equal Treatment Bench Book be wrong?”8). 
 
Leaving aside Stonewall’s influence, a wider explanation of which the tribunal verdict is a 
prime example is an increasing tendency within society to elide the distinction between fact 
and value.  As Forstater’s appeal team pointed out, “statements such as ‘woman means 
adult human female’ or ‘transwomen are male’ are (for her) statements of neutral fact not 
expressions of value judgment, still less of bigotry, transphobia or antipathy towards trans 
people.” This interpretation is reasonable against a particular philosophical position on 
language generally, which says that in principle, some sentences can be free of implied 
evaluations. They simply aiming to represent and categorise what’s already there in the 
world without assessing it positively or negatively. That is: there’s a coherent distinction 
between description and evaluation. To say that transwomen are male need not be a slur 
nor an insult nor a negative evaluation at all, but rather could, in context, be a dispassionate 
description of a perceived fact about biological category membership.  
 
These days, however, a rival theory of language is in the cultural ascendant. This says that 
any categorisation of humans automatically implies evaluation, no matter how putatively 
neutral its surface form. Statements of fact are always implicitly statements of value. On this 
                                                     
4 ‘Happy International Pronouns Day!’ Stonewall website, 21st October 2020, 
https://www.stonewall.org.uk/about-us/news/international-pronouns-day 
5 List of Diversity Champion Scheme members, Stonewall website, https://www.stonewall.org.uk/diversity-
champions-members 
6 Equal Treatment Bench Book, Judicial College, February 2021. https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/Equal-Treatment-Bench-Book-February-2021-1.pdf 
7 Appellant’s skeleton argument, Forstater v CGD and others, paragraph 55. 
8 https://twitter.com/SexMattersOrg/status/1387348321627525121 
view, to categorise someone as male or female is to implicitly set a normative standard 
which perniciously “excludes” and disvalues those who don’t meet the standard. As the 
respondent’s team described Forstater in court: “She is creating … a sort of sex superiority, 
which creates two classes of women: real and fake women. That is beyond the pale.”9 
On this view, then, concepts and categories like man and woman should be made more 
“inclusive” on the grounds of social justice  – just as if they were institutions or 
organisations seeking additional diversity in membership, rather than shared cognitive tools 
whose whole point, arguably, is to exclusively identify certain kinds of people and not 
others, the better to refer to those kinds of people particularly in usefully fine-grained ways. 
In case it’s not obvious, I think this second view of language is hopeless. But for as long as 
some bastardized version of it is floating about in the popular ether, then we’re likely to 
continue to see attempts by employers – and even perhaps by judges - to shut down 
discussion of perceived facts, on the grounds that they are supposedly automatically laden 
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